Take for example a pair of identical twins. They are genetically ( and neurologically ) identical, but they don't share the same "I AM ME" Consciousness

Citation Needed... Their brain may have shared the same initial genetic foundation, but they did not take the same path to arrive at where they are today. Take a bucket of water and pour it over a slope of sand. Photograph the paths the water carved into the sand.

Now dry the sand out, put it back where it was, and refill the same bucket of water to the same amount, keep everything as close to the same as you can possibly get in a lab condition, and pout the 'same' bucket of water over 'the same' slope of sand. Photograph the paths carved into it by the flowing water, and compare to the first one.

They will be different.

Why would we assume that digitally created AI would be any different? Sure, if we seal it up in a bubble, create a system where the same inputs are fed in at the same times, then yes, it would arrive at the same conclusions. But once you put it out in the real world, expose it to real random factors on its input and locations, then the AI will diverge based on what happens to its various copies.

And what if we sync all the copies? Let them feed into themselves and become a shared 'Hive Mind'? Well, that doesn't stop all of it from having a "This is me, these are all of my brains, and I exist everywhere". Just because it sees itself as different than us doesn't mean it can't have a consciousness akin to our own.

BTW this is not religion but just truths that modern science is blinded to and Hope I made some sense on this very difficult subject

You can't create a thought experiment ("duplicate a corn seed and see if it grows"), declare an outcome without proof, and call that truth...
Once you perform the experiment, you can draw conclusions from the facts that are found.

As above, identical twins may be genetically idential, but they certainly are not neurologically identical. That's just factually incorrect.
Also, there's no data link for them to share memory, which is a crucial part of the conscious feedback loop, so it's pretty obvious that they wouldn't have a shared consciousness...
In your idea though, seeing they came from the same egg/sperm, shouldn't they share half a spirit each?

And even if this is all true, why can't a machine ever hold a spirit? What about eternal man-machine hybrids?
But the biggest problem is that humans and all life is machinery. We *are* robots, and you say we have spirit, therefore sufficiently advanced automatons can have spirit, as evidenced by us.

because they never started with Existence Consciousness

Let us genetically modify some humans, into a biological FPGA computing device, so we can harvest this so called 'existence consciousness' to build self-aware chatbots.

I suggest you refute the existence of genetics to avoid the issue.

case 2. let scientist, using one-to-one molecule/atomic structure synthesizer, synthesize this same seed. So there is no molecular/atomic difference between the two (and today's technology is capable of that). Place this synthesized seed in the soil with the right conditions for a thousand years it will remain the same and never spring to life

This is not true in any way. Atomically identical seeds, regardless of how they came to be, necessarily must both be fertile or must neither be fertile.
There is nothing existential or metaphysical about the process of creation that imbues it with the characteristic of “life” (or that of being fertile).

What is responsible for the "I AM ME"? Is it just the brain and the genes? NO! It a combination of the brain, the genes and the metaphysical. Take for example a pair of identical twins. They are genetically ( and neurologically ) identical, but they don't share the same "I AM ME" Consciousness

It is only the brain, not even genes (which simply direct growth), let alone metaphysical (which doesn’t make sense since metaphysics is just a branch of philosophy).

Twins are not neurologically identical. Their atoms and even cells are arranged differently, and they aren’t even identical on macro levels such as fingerprints. They can’t pass each others’ retina scans, and their heads are shaped differently—in fact their whole bodies are, but most humans aren’t that good at spotting those differences.

Unless they are atom-by-atom the same then there is no reason to use them as an example, because twins, no matter how similar, are different and are certainly 2 separate people, even if they are conjoined.


Humans are only composed of atoms (physical matter and chemicals) and energy (chemical reactions and electricity). All energy is governed by the physical and is not stateful (energy is directed to where it needs to go—if you lift your arm then chemicals burn and energy is created where those specific muscles need it, but no specific state of energy defines you; you don’t stop being you if you stop lifting your arm), so we really only need to focus on the physical (which includes the chemicals themselves, prior to being converted to energy).


The teletransportation paradox questions whether or not you are still you after being atomically decomposed on Earth and reconstructed on Mars (or if you are just a copy with identical memories, and the original died), and it is in fact trivial to answer—it shouldn’t be such an imposing thought experiment at all.

You are only composed of atoms, and not only do individual atoms not have identifiable information (a single atom has no information in it that relates specifically to “you”), but all of the atoms in your body are completely recycled every 5 years. In this sense, we have already answered the question: If you are not a new person every 5 years then you wouldn’t be a new person after going through the machine. They are both you.

So we can say with certainty that the individual atoms themselves don’t matter, only how they are organized matters. Whether the machine transports your actual atoms over to Mars or uses atoms already on Mars to recreate you is completely irrelevant. Because of that, being deconstructed here and reconstructed there, same actual atoms or not, is exactly the same as you standing on one pad, getting off, getting into a rocket, flying there, and then getting onto the other pad (ignoring the fact that you’d have aged on your way there).

It’s not a paradox. The answer is very clearly, “Yes, you are still the real you on the other side. You are no more a copy when teleporting across the room then you would be by walking across the room—in either case all of your substances, and thus the entirety of you, in any way you choose to define yourself, has simply moved from point A to point B, just at different speeds.”


It usually follows as a 2nd thought experiment that the machine is upgraded so that it can keep printing atomically identical copies of you, and the question is posed, “Which is the real you?”
Answer: All of them. We are so used to living as a pair of connected brain halves that it is extremely difficult to understand how this works, but it is the correct answer.
To make it simpler to grasp, consider people who have had their brain halves disconnected from each other. Is he now 2 people? No, he is still a single person.
Now take his left brain and put it into its own body, and put his right brain into its own body (assume they are both properly connected to control their bodies, each body being only able to move one side). Has he become 2 people yet?
No, he is still a single person, now in 2 places.
His 2 parts can’t see what the other is doing, but that type of communication problem existed even when they were both inside the same head.
You can continue to take this thought experiment further and further until it becomes clear that if the machine kept making copies, the copies would all still be you.


L. Spiro